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Humanitarian governance is usually understood according to the classic, Dunantist paradigm that 
accords central importance to international humanitarian agencies. However, this is increasingly 
paralleled by ‘resilience humanitarianism’ that focuses, among other things, on including national 
actors in humanitarian governance. This article views humanitarian governance as emerging 
through interactions between authorities, implementing agencies and communities. It is based on 
interactive ethnography in five countries by Partners for Resilience (PfR). Using the Theory 
of Change (ToC) tool, it analyses the various interpretations and priorities of actors involved in 
humanitarian problems, solutions and programme governance. For example, PfR had a ‘software’ 
focus, aiming to unlock communities’ potential for resilience, whereas communities and authori-
ties preferred to receive tangible ‘hardware’ support. The findings highlight the crucial role of 
local authorities in shaping humanitarian aid. This is especially pertinent in view of the inter-
national agenda to localise aid, which requires the understanding and support of national actors 
in order to responsibly protect the vulnerable. 
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Introduction
Humanitarian aid has long been dominated by a classical Dunantist paradigm based 
on humanitarian ethics. However, in recent years, this paradigm has been paralleled 
by ‘resilience humanitarianism’ (Ilcan and Rygiel, 2015; Hilhorst, 2018), which links 
relief to development and focuses on local people and institutions as the first respond-
ers to crisis. Resilience humanitarianism first appeared in the domain of disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) and increasingly underpins refugee care and aid in countries tran-
sitioning from conflict to peace. Classical and resilience humanitarianism differ 
radically as to how interventions are (supposed to be) governed. Governance in 
classical humanitarianism centres chiefly on the United Nations (UN), international 
donors, and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Resilience 
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humanitarianism, by contrast, emphasises the role of national and local authorities, 
service providers from crisis-affected areas, and affected communities. To further 
the debate on this new humanitarian-governance paradigm, this article explores gov-
ernance in an international programme promoting community resilience.
 This Partners for Resilience (PfR) programme was organised by five Netherlands-
based INGOs between 2011 and 2015, and implemented in nine countries. Through 
a unique research collaboration evolving in the wake of the programme, PfR and a 
group of academic researchers engaged in interactive research designed and imple-
mented in close dialogue with societal partners. With interactive research, unlike action 
research, researchers retain their analytical independence. In six countries (Ethiopia, 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, and the Philippines), researchers analysed 
the programme during three- to five-month periods of qualitative fieldwork, explor-
ing the programme rationale and realities in the different countries. PfR used a model 
of governance that included the PfR partners, national and local authorities, and 
the communities where the programme was implemented. Our research focused on 
how the collaboration between these stakeholders was understood by the different 
partners, and how it developed over time.
 Humanitarian governance can be approached very comprehensively (e.g. Barnett’s 
(2013, p. 380) view of humanitarian governance as pertaining to the ‘global emer-
gence of an order geared to improve people’s wellbeing’), comprising an immense 
web of domains and bodies of practice, extending to development, human rights, 
peace-building, and humanitarian aid. Here, however, we focus on an everyday, 
limited interpretation of humanitarian governance as governing humanitarian action. 
Although this may appear to be a straightforward sub-theme, it is not. Humanitarian-
aid budgets are deployed across diverse settings and crises, and there are many differ-
ences in humanitarian governance between classical humanitarianism and resilience 
humanitarianism.
 Barnett’s (2013) research agenda for humanitarian governance includes four ques-
tions that are highly relevant to the present study: 
•	 What kind of world is being imagined and produced? 
•	 Who governs? 
•	 How is humanitarian governance organised and accomplished? 
•	 By what authority do humanitarians govern, and what do they do with that 
authority? 
While the first two questions do not specify an actor, the last two put humanitar-
ians at the centre of the analysis. Most humanitarian-governance literature focuses 
strongly on international humanitarian agencies, and most studies on humanitarian 
practice take as a normative and actual point of departure the humanitarian princi-
ples and implementation-styles of large agencies such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, or UN bodies. Other actors, including 
national authorities and affected communities, appear in the analysis through the eyes 
of these international humanitarian actors.
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 Starting from the idea that governance is not simply steered by these international 
agencies but is also formed in practice by a number of actors including humanitarian-
service providers, governments, and local community figures, Barnett’s questions 
become layered and complex. For example, the first question (‘What kind of world 
is being imagined and produced?’) can be rephrased to ask what kind of world is 
imagined by different humanitarian-governance actors. How are different viewpoints 
negotiated, and which views gain legitimacy? What contradictions exist between the 
formal view and views conveyed in everyday reality, and between agreed govern-
ance roles and real governance as it unfolds in practice? Rather than assuming that 
humanitarian action is governed by humanitarian agencies, we advocate studying 
humanitarian governance as an interplay between humanitarian agencies, national 
authorities and affected communities (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).
 Given the layers and variations in governance, case studies are important for 
analysing humanitarian governance in practice. This article elaborates on the PfR 
country studies, which used a similar set of questions and analytical framework. We 
used the Theory of Change (ToC) tool to investigate how different stakeholders framed 
DRR and how they viewed different actors’ roles in DRR. The findings provide 
insight into the contradictions, possibilities, and impossibilities of humanitarian gov-
ernance which includes local actors and communities.
 This article is especially relevant in view of humanitarian sector changes heralded 
during the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) of 2016. The WHS made a strong 
plea for localising humanitarian aid, giving greater focus to the role of national gov-
ernments, service providers, and affected communities in the governance of humani-
tarian assistance. A major outcome of the WHS was the commitment of approximately 
50 key actors to making a ‘Grand Bargain’ in order to accelerate efforts to dispense 
humanitarian budgets directly to service providers in crisis-affected areas. Clearly, 
governance models and analyses of humanitarian action need to become more con-
scious of these local actors.
 We incorporate findings from five of the six case studies conducted.1 To facilitate 
insight into the dynamics of local humanitarian governance, we present one of these 
case studies in depth, analysing the other four cases more briefly to identify common-
alities and variations in issues of local humanitarian governance. The major case 
study presented here concerns Ethiopia, where all three authors participated in the 
fieldwork. The first and third authors coordinated the PfR study, including a joint 
visit to Ethiopia, and the second author was the primary researcher for the Ethiopia 
case study.
 We begin by detailing interactive research, followed by the presentation of PfR’s 
(partly explicit and partly implicit) ToC, which we constructed and validated based 
on a review of reports and interviews. A section on Ethiopia then analyses how PfR, 
authorities, and communities each had a different view of the issues and responsi-
bilities in DRR and how this affected the programme. The next section provides 
brief analyses of the other case studies, leading to the conclusion, in which a number 
of cross-cutting issues and concerns are raised.
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Interactive research: method and theoretical underpinning 
This article originated in a request from the PfR alliance, which was financed by 
the Dutch government for five years. The partners in this alliance included the 
Netherlands Red Cross, the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre, Cordaid, 
Wetlands International, and CARE Netherlands. The programme brought together 
agencies with humanitarian, climate, DRR, land-use (ecosystem management) and 
mixed humanitarian–development profiles. They wanted to develop a comprehen-
sive approach building on their different areas of expertise to enhance community 
resilience in nine disaster-prone lower-income countries.2
 This article is based on a study conducted in four phases from 2013 to 2015. The 
purpose of the overall study was to assess the dynamics and relevance of an integrated 
approach to building resilience. The research was designed in an interactive way, 
with the phases of data collection and analysis alternating with phases of reflection 
with PfR representatives (Argyris and Schön, 1991; van der Haar, Heijmans, and 
Hilhorst, 2013).
 The first phase of the study consisted of a systematic review of the key policy docu-
ments of PfR and its country teams. Data were entered and analysed using NVivo 
data-analysis software, according to a coding book developed by the researchers 
and validated by PfR. The findings of this phase were discussed in a workshop that 
informed the empirical questions guiding the in-country data collection.After the 
case studies, which were discussed and validated by in-country workshops, a general 
analysis was conducted. This analysis was presented and discussed on various occa-
sions with PfR partners. PfR responded to the final report with a policy brief detail-
ing their feedback on the findings and the policy implications they distilled from 
the research for incorporation in their next five-year programme cycle.3
Understanding governance
This article highlights and analyses findings pertaining to humanitarian governance 
from the six-country research programme. The concept of governance came into 
fashion in the 1990s, partly to clarify the layered and fragmented ways state power 
is used to achieve collective purposes, and partly in response to changing ideas and 
practices, with collective purposes no longer being solely the domain of the state 
(Colebatch, 2009). In Europe, Rhodes (1996, p. 57) described the shift from ‘govern-
ment’ to ‘governance’, where ‘the state becomes a collection of inter-organisational 
networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able 
to steer or regulate’. 
 In development processes, the central importance accorded to states in the pursuit 
of collective purposes had already been eroded since the early 1980s, when non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) came to be considered more effective and intrin-
sically more inclined to make communities and participatory development the start-
ing point of their endeavours (Edwards and Hulme, 1992, 1996). After a period of 
acclaim for NGOs (at the expense of the state), it is now more common to build 
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development on a framework of interactive governance, where the formulation, 
promotion, and achievement of common objectives comes about through different 
governance arrangements involving multiple types of actor, including the state and 
NGOs (Torfing et al., 2012, p. 2; Howes et al., 2015; Parker, 2007). Interactive gov-
ernance has been defined as ‘the complex process through which a plurality of social 
and political actors with diverging interests interact by means of mobilizing, exchang-
ing, and deploying a range of ideas, rules, and resources’ (Torfing et al., 2012, p. 2). 
 In industrialised societies, the idea of governance has been used as a frame to 
understand the changing roles of government; however, in humanitarian aid, gov-
ernance has rarely been analysed in relation to the state in crisis-affected countries. 
‘Humanitarian governance’ is mainly used to describe how a chain of humanitarian 
action comes about. Schematically, this chain starts from the international discursive 
framing of humanitarian crises, moving to the deployment of public resources in 
donor countries, the implementing machinery consisting of the UN and INGOs, 
and finally to accountability and participatory approaches at the grassroots level. In 
critical humanitarian governance studies, the grassroots level is often analysed as 
instrumental in governmentality attempts, or the shaping of the humanitarian subject 
according to the image of humanitarian governance (Duffield, 2014).
 Only very recently has the notion of humanitarian governance expanded to 
encompass national authorities and other national institutions shaping humanitari-
anism praxis. As is often the case in this domain, the discussion has normative, opera-
tional, and empirical angles. The normative angle stems from acknowledging the 
role of national authorities and aid providers in international policy discourse on aid. 
This discourse is operationalised through interactive governance designs that confer 
roles to different actors in aid. Interactive governance models are ‘messier’ than models 
where the government imposes rules. Governance narratives acknowledge the roles 
of actors inside and outside government, but also point to the blurring of roles and 
responsibilities, the interdependence of these actors’ actions, and the relative unim-
portance of command and imposition (Colebatch, 2009, p. 63).
 Empirically, we need to look beyond the design of governance to questions of how 
this works out in practice—what some authors refer to as ‘real’ governance (Titeca 
and de Herdt, 2011). Different layers of complexity are involved in multi-actor gov-
ernance. First, the actors involved in governance arrangements represent different 
types of institutions, with different normative orders and operating styles, and gov-
ernance is always negotiated and subject to multiple interpretations (Kraushaar and 
Lambach, 2009; Putzel and DiJohn, 2012). Studying humanitarian governance requires 
the development of an ‘antenna’ for these different interpretations and how they stag-
nate, promote, or change programmes in the course of implementation.
 Second, there is a great deal of diversity within the categories that make up gov-
ernance arrangements. NGOs are often grouped together, but they differ widely in 
world-views, mandates, and operating styles. Other examples are local government 
officers who perform different practices from the central state, or organised commu-
nity leaders with different views from more marginal community members. Although 
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this could potentially lead to infinite, and therefore impossible, levels of fine-tuning 
of our understanding of humanitarian governance, it is important to be aware of 
these diversities and to bring them into the analysis when they are significant. Finally, 
governance always has both formal and informal dimensions, and there may be 
large discrepancies and contradictions between formal and practical norms. Studies 
of humanitarian governance must therefore address how norms and policies trans-
late into practice (Olivier de Sardan, 2011).
Theories of change as a methodological tool
Our research was informed by the above insights into governance, but we built an 
analytical framework on applied theories which the partners of PfR were already 
familiar with. These included the characteristics of a resilient community as identified 
by Twigg (2009), the Department for International Development’s (DFID) liveli-
hood characteristics (DFID, 1999) and the ‘5Cs’ framework (Keijzer et al., 2011). We 
also used the notion of ToC as a methodological tool to unravel some of the complex 
layers of governance. ToC, which has been introduced in development program-
ming to replace more conventional log-frames, maps how an organisation, project, 
network, or group of stakeholders understand political, social, economic, and/or cul-
tural change to happen, and how they see themselves contributing to that change. 
ToC aims to define all the building blocks required for the achievement of a long-
term goal. This includes the smaller outcomes needed for larger change, as well as 
the interventions thought to lead to these outcomes. Importantly, a ToC also clarifies 
how interventions and outcomes are understood to be linked (Anderson, 2006).
 To make our conversations with PfR actors about the ToC useful in our explora-
tion of governance, we introduced two changes to the managerial notion of ToC. 
First, we introduced the idea of ‘theories of change’ to emphasise that the authorita-
tive or formal ToC is subject to interpretation by different actors and may not be 
considered legitimate by all actors. Second, we emphasised that, although a ToC 
represents the story an entity tells about its context, its contribution, and itself, this 
may not correspond to the ToC conveyed through the organisation’s practices. In 
terms of governance theory, ToC represents formal norms and practices; it is nec-
essary to establish empirically how these relate to practical norms and practices.
Research question and fieldwork methodology
This article addresses the question of how humanitarian governance, understood as 
multi-actor arrangements to deliver humanitarian services and goods, comes about 
when resilience is promoted in local contexts. To make the analysis possible, we 
focused this study of governance on interactions between humanitarians, authorities, 
and communities.
 Knowing that different actors may work through different logics and have different 
ways of framing the ‘problem of DRR and lack of resilience’, we asked how different 
actors responded to PfR’s ToC. What did they identify as the main humanitarian 
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problem? What objective did they want to attain? How, by whom, when, and where 
could this be achieved? In the initial phase of the PfR programme, we observed 
that PfR actors tended to distinguish sharply between so-called hardware approaches 
(i.e. predominantly transfer of materials and tangible field-activities) and software 
approaches (i.e. working on social structures and processes, and skill transfers). We 
maintained this distinction in the interviews. In addition to collecting different views 
on how the programme should be carried out, we also asked how the programme 
worked out in practice.
 In each of the country studies, national-level actors were first interviewed—
individually, through focus-groups and in workshops. In dialogue with the research 
participants, the researchers then identified multiple case studies to investigate the 
alliance in action at the local level, where government officials, community members, 
and NGO staff members running the field operations were approached. The sub-
country cases varied to some extent: they usually comprised geographical areas, but 
there were also several specific activities and campaigns selected for investigation.
Data gathering
Data gathering in the five countries largely followed the same pattern. Here, we elab-
orate solely the process for Ethiopia, where the four case-study sites were widely 
scattered across the country. As Figure 1 shows, the case study sites were selected to 
represent different implementing partners, agro-ecological zone types (the Borena, 
Afar, and Dire Dawa lowlands, with different forms of agro-pastoralism, and the 
farmed highlands around Ibnat in the Amhara region), timespans of PfR implemen-
tation (inception in 2009, 2011, and 2013), and activities.
Figure 1. Map of PfR implementation sites and case-study sites in Ethiopia 
Source: modified from Desportes (2015, p. 20).
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 In all these sites, field staff, community members, and government officials from 
the kebeles (lowest-level governance) and woredas (district governance-level) were 
asked about their framing of the problem, interpretation of their role and the roles of 
others, and perceptions of the programme. In-country NGO staff members facili-
tated the fieldwork logistics, but, as much as possible, the interviews were one-on-one, 
without the presence of NGO or government observers. The federal government’s 
perspective could not be directly included in 2014, but we also draw upon an inter-
view with a federal government official conducted by the second author in 2017 as 
part of another humanitarian governance research project.
 Secondary sources such as project-monitoring reports, local risk assessments, action 
plans, and environmental impact-assessments were also analysed to gain a full under-
standing of the programme rationales and the practicalities of its implementation.
PfR’s ToC
PfR did not have a ready-made ToC, but it did have many policy ideas about how 
the programme should work, with building blocks, working principles, and objec-
tives. Based on a content-analysis of reports and a workshop with the Netherlands-
based alliance coordinators, we constructed and validated the following ToC as the 
principal storyline of the alliance:
1) Communities face major and multiple disaster risks.
2) Reducing these risks requires strengthening community resilience, and therefore 
communities should be central in the programme.
3) To reduce people’s vulnerability to the impact of hazards, it is important that they 
can anticipate, respond to, adapt to, and transform disaster risk.
4) Enhancing livelihood opportunities is important and should be part of risk-
reduction activities.
5) To reduce the root causes of disaster risk, ecosystem management and restoration 
(EMR), and climate change adaptation (CCA) need to be integrated into DRR.
6) A successful integration of DRR, CCA, and EMR requires working across dif-
ferent geographical areas and timescales.
7) The integration of different approaches to working towards community resilience 
requires strengthening the collaboration between multiple stakeholders across sectors.
8) Because ‘disasters’ usually result from processes beyond the locality of manifesta-
tion, they require solutions that are not in the hands of communities alone, so it is 
important to involve stakeholders at different societal levels, including the govern-
ment and research institutions.
9) Because of the complexity of the problem and the programme there is a strong need 
to be adaptive.
 This ToC shows that multi-actor governance is a central element of PfR’s approach. 
Starting from the understanding that supporting the resilience of communities requires 
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a comprehensive approach, the alliance wants to strengthen collaboration between 
multiple stakeholders across sectors. The alliance also emphasises that this multi-
stakeholder collaboration must happen at different societal levels. This ToC was con-
structed and validated with the PfR steering-groups before the start of the fieldwork, 
and hence could be used as input for the country studies.
Findings from Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, PfR was carried out from 2011 to 2015 by an alliance comprising the 
Ethiopian branches of Cordaid and CARE, the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, and 
five local partners4 (hereafter referred to as ‘implementing partners’, in contrast to 
the ‘alliance partners’). Wetlands International and the Red Cross Red Crescent 
Climate Centre provided technical advice and training from their regional centres. 
In addition to policy and advocacy activities to disseminate lessons learned and facili-
tate project take-over, the PfR partners carried out various activities in their nine 
project implementation sites, as summarised in Table 2.
 Before detailing how community and government members aligned or did not 
align with PfR’s ToC, it is useful to describe the broader country context. As far as 
relations between the government, communities, and NGOs in Ethiopia are con-
cerned, development and humanitarian endeavours are largely government-led. 
This has been the case since the implementation of large-scale environmental res-
toration programmes in the 1980s, where community members were ‘put to work’ 
restoring their ‘overused’ and ‘degraded’ environment, following the neo-Malthusian 
Table 1. Overview of respondents and data collection methods, Ethiopia 
Method and respondent category Number 
Semi-structured interviews with alliance partners 8
Semi-structured interviews with implementing partners 7
Informal discussions with community members, most often at project sites 47
Focus-group discussions (n = 16) with community members in seven kebeles 129
Semi-structured interviews with kebele government officials 9
Semi-structured interviews with woreda government officials 18
Semi-structured interviews with regional government officials 1
Semi-structured interviews with external stakeholders (e.g. university staff, in-country consult-
ants and NGO facilitators)
6
Observation at the Ethiopian Red Cross Society’s ‘Enhancing system and community resilience’ 
panel discussion (16/08/2014), key stakeholders (e.g. UN official)
5
Total 230
Source: modified from Desportes (2015, p. 26).
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narrative deconstructed by Hoben (1996). This large-scale government-engineered 
development approach conforms to the high-modernist approach of Ethiopian state-
building, which strongly asserts state sovereignty and ‘control over natural resources 
and the people that use them’ (Fantini and Puddu, 2016, pp. 97–98). State control 
is also asserted over continually diminishing numbers of civil-society organisations 
and NGOs, largely viewed by the government as a parallel and inefficient resource-
provision system (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). NGOs’ ‘recurring difficulties in 
negotiating presence, access, and operational space’ (del Valle and Healy, 2013, p. 189) 
were exacerbated following the contested 2005 elections and the added administra-
tive restrictions of the 2009 Charities and Societies proclamation (Carruth, 2016; 
Corbet et al., 2017; International Centre for Non-Profit Law, 2012). However, to 
some extent, international donors and NGOs have adjusted to government control. 
As Hoben (1996, p. 197) noted, ‘the humanitarian, community, and environmental 
emphases’ of large-scale modernist environmental programmes made them ‘live with, 
and even appreciate, the top-down and even authoritarian way’ in which the gov-
ernment controls them.
Diverging ToCs
Table 3 summarises the major ToC building blocks (problem definition, description 
of the goal, and specifics of ‘how’, ‘who’, ‘when’, and ‘where’ to attain that goal) by 
three major kinds of actor types (PfR staff, government, and communities), although 
internal variations did of course occur.
Table 2. PfR Ethiopia categories of interventions 
Intervention Examples
1. Ecosystem management and restoration Rangeland rehabilitation through enclosures, hillside rehabilitation 
through terracing, soil and water conservation with soil band and 
check dams
2. Livelihood diversification Setting up savings and loan associations; cooperatives producing aloe 
vera soap, honey or energy-saving stoves; distributing goats or chickens; 
providing irrigation infrastructure such as ponds, dams, canals, or drip 
irrigation; distributing seed and farming tools
3. Establishing and strengthening  
community institutions 
•	 Committees	responsible	for	managing	disaster	risk	in	their	kebele,	
with some also acting as local early-warning committees
•	 Committees	managing	specific	PfR	interventions	(e.g.	an	irrigation	
committee)
•	 Environmental	school	clubs
4. Training •	 Theoretical	and	practical	skill	transfer,	for	instance	concerning	farm-
ing, meteorological forecasts, and accounting (including specific 
capacity training for the newly established community institutions)
•	 Training	in	the	form	of	exchanges	between	(implementing)	partners,	
government officials, and communities, with joint risk assessment 
and development of action plans
Source: Desportes, 2015, p. 24.
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Table 3. Major ToC building blocks by actor type 
ToC building block PfR staff Government Communities
Problem	statement •	 Hazards
•	 Degraded	ecosystem	
and various pressures 
on it
•	 Lack	of	agency	 
(aid dependency)
•	 Hazards
•	 Environmental	 
degradation
•	 Lack	of	financial	 
resources
•	 Communities’	poor	
mindsets
•	 Lack	of	resources	and	
opportunities
•	 Hazards	and	rain	 
dependency
Goal •	 Resilience	 
(i.e. livelihoods pro-
tected and growing 
sustainably)
•	 Decreased	need	for	
emergency aid, stable 
livelihoods
•	 Livelihoods	protected	
and growing sustainably
Solutions: What/how •	 Empowerment	predomi-
nantly via software, but 
also hardware
•	 Creating	an	enabling	
environment (advocacy, 
commitment, structures, 
plans)
•	 Environmental	 
restoration
•	 Hardware	especially	 
(no excessive meddling 
in local structures)
•	 Hardware	support
•	 Increased	practical	
knowledge and skills
Solutions: Who •	 Community-driven
•	 Government-supported
•	 Communities’	labour	
(not necessarily ideas)
•	 NGOs	(following	govern-
ment approach)
•	 Government
•	 NGOs
•	 Government
Solutions: When/Where •	 Short-term
•	 Wider	landscape
•	 Engaging	supra-local	
governance levels
•	 Short-	and	long-term	
(not bound to political 
term)
•	 Locally	centred
•	 Short-term
•	 Community-centred
Source: modified from Hilhorst et al. (2015).
Problem definition
Table 3 highlights some similarities but also many differences in ToC perspectives. 
Although all actors mentioned the strenuous environment and recurrent droughts as 
major problems, PfR staff members emphasised a combination of environmental fac-
tors and attitude-problems at sites with a long history of NGO presence. Government 
officials stressed the problem of dependency, whereas community members spoke 
mainly of acute poverty and difficulty surviving in a degraded environment.
Goal definition
Definition of the overall PfR programme goal varied among staff members, with 
a more basic form given by field staff (e.g. reducing poverty or reducing the impact 
of natural hazards on livelihoods) and more holistic representations from the Addis 
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Ababa-based office staff. In its most detailed form, the desired goal is a resilient com-
munity characterised by ‘embedded’ and sustainable livelihoods. Embeddedness echoes 
the EMR component. As one staff member explained, it means that ‘livelihoods must 
be grounded in people’s environment in such a way that the surrounding resources 
are sufficient to support them’.5 Sustainability was viewed mainly in relation to CCA, 
with viable livelihoods in the long term, resisting climatic variability. DRR, CCA, 
and EMR are thus integrated in PfR’s ToC and linked to livelihoods.
 Community understanding was often similar to that of PfR staff, as reflected in 
this statement from a male community member in Ibnat (1 October 2014):
The aim is to alleviate the risks which acted on us previously, such as soil erosion and flood 
and drought. The project enables [us] to retain our wealth, our livelihood. 
 Although government officials also aimed for stable livelihoods, they stressed that 
this would lessen the need for emergency relief. Their understanding was far less 
integrated than the view of PfR. They tended to conceptualise change in sectoral 
terms, such as objectives for agriculture or irrigation, matching the government’s 
sectoral organisation.
Solutions: how
In explaining how resilience could be achieved, Ethiopian PfR staff members mainly 
emphasised the roles of the community. A community first needed to be empow-
ered through participatory risk assessments and action plans, as well as by software 
activities such as training and the formation of community committees. An empow-
ered community was presented as aware of its environment and how it could act 
within it. In their focus on communities, alliance partners emphasised the develop-
ment of social institutions over providing material assistance. Several staff interviews 
made it clear that their agencies believed institutional development was key for food 
security because it would unlock resources available in the community—notably 
local knowledge. Staff members from agencies with a more humanitarian background 
departed slightly from this dominant understanding, giving more space to hardware 
support for community activities.
 Whereas the PfR partners emphasised the strengthening of community institu-
tions as a precondition for resilience, the government and communities stressed the 
importance of the provision of material support. This difference was apparent in 
interviews, leading to discussion on programme implementation. For example, a 
woreda government official from a Borena cooperative office complained that PfR 
did not release funds for a qualified external accountant for the savings group, as is 
done by other NGOs in the area.6 PfR wanted community members to learn this 
activity themselves in order to be independent in the long term.7
 There were also commonalities in the ToCs. In the PfR approach, empowered 
communities to regain and fortify a natural asset base via community-based natural 
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soil and water conservation activities. This clearly resonated with the federal gov-
ernment’s strong focus on environmental resource management in recent decades.8 
Communities’ appreciation for this environmental approach differed depending on 
how long they had been involved, increasing over time. A community which had 
worked with this approach since 2009 had seen more tangible results, including in 
terms of livelihoods, than had one where PfR began more recently.
 Although there was significant agreement about the steps required, ideas on how 
these should translate into practice differed radically. All parties, for example, agreed 
that livelihoods should be diversified to improve resistance to shocks and stresses. 
In the case of pastoralist communities, however, government policies tended to be 
geared towards (forced) resettlement into consolidated centres, which could become 
centres of livelihood activities. These communities were mostly opposed to this 
idea, instead favouring alternative options supporting livestock-rearing and small-
scale diversification. PfR staff members emphasised the need to respect communities’ 
choices and traditional ways of living. The PfR implementing partners were more 
diverse in their attitudes towards pastoralism, with some leaning towards govern-
ment policies and others towards the communities’ perspective, as well as engaging 
more openly with parallel pastoralist traditional governance systems. In practice, the 
programme took on different shapes in different areas, depending mainly on the local 
implementing partner and their relationship with the government. Some local imple-
menting partners could in fact be classified as ‘government-oriented NGOs’, acting 
as a local arm of the government.
Solutions: who
Ideas about who should play the lead role on the path towards resilience aligned 
closely with the actors’ preferred path. According to Ethiopian PfR staff, empowered 
communities should take the driving seat in building resilience. This was considered 
effective (grounded in local context), efficient (involving locals from the start increases 
community acceptance), sustainable (built on local structures), and cost-effective.
 Moreover, PfR aimed to move away from competition among agencies ‘working 
in silos’ to reach their objectives towards partnership and learning. On a wall in a 
Borena DRR community group office set up by PfR, a poster (Figure 2) unpacked 
the ‘big shift’ deemed necessary to implement the programme. Instead of dominat-
ing and teaching, programme staff should facilitate. They should not extract but 
empower, preferably with visual means rather than by sending messages. Relations 
should be open, and people should think about the community.
 A striking difference in the ToCs is how government officials did not see commu-
nities as key in the bottom-up identification of needs, but rather as the lowest level of 
a top-down governance model and a workforce to implement activities. Interviews 
with local woreda and kebele government officials indicated that, rather than listening 
to the communities’ views, these officials saw working with the communities as an 
opportunity to teach them how to implement (government) development programmes. 
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Several government officials in Dewe and Ibnat highlighted that the role of com-
munity committees was not to take decisions, but to ‘provide information’.
 Having been subject to top-down governance structures for decades, community 
members had internalised the government perspective, looking towards governments 
and NGOs to provide necessary material support.
Solutions: when and where
Whereas local government actors and community members saw the programme as 
a local, time-bound endeavour, PfR members wanted the resilience-building expe-
riences to extend beyond the end of the programme and to spread to other areas to 
achieve longer-term, larger-scale change. This is why advocacy was one of the alli-
ance’s strategic objectives.
Still, we observed variation in the entry-point to advocacy among PfR staff mem-
bers. The Netherlands-based PfR partners often explained advocacy using rights-
based jargon, but Ethiopian partners were very careful not to frame advocacy in 
political terms. PfR Ethiopia maintained an apolitical profile by refraining from 
advocacy beyond bringing practical community needs to the government’s attention. 
Community members such as the pastoral networks were likewise trained to pro-
pose their own solutions and advocate for their needs with local authorities. The 
Ethiopian Red Cross Society was especially cautious not to jeopardise its auxiliary 
position with the government. One staff member explained (22 September 2014) its 
approach as follows: 
Figure 2. ‘Big shift’ within which PfR is embedded 
Source: Desportes 2015, p. 42.
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The government is fine with us establishing committees. Most did not know this approach 
before. When we teach about it, they are happy, appreciate the philosophy behind it. It fails 
only if it is associated with politics. We need to focus on practical problem-solving [. . .] 
It is invisible politics. 
Theory versus practice
Despite PfR’s strong discourse on communities being in the driving seat, the poster 
shown in Figure 2 hints at a different reality. The handwritten poster reflects the 
isolated and impoverished environment in Ethiopia’s southern periphery. However, 
in a community where people speak Oromifaa, the poster was written in English. This 
raises the question of how its message might be translated into practice, and also 
illustrates the governance relations in the programme.
 On the one hand, the programme employed a participatory approach, placing a 
premium on decision-making in the community. The following attitude expressed 
by an Ibnat resident (1 October 2014) was not unusual: 
We don’t believe the Red Cross will continue with us. It will leave us. But it gave us the 
capacity, the knowledge, technical, materials, in order to handle things. We acknowledge 
it with good mood. We have a committee in place, a water management system. We did 
the activities without payment until now. We can continue. 
 On the other hand, communities might have different priorities from those facili-
tated by PfR. The communities often expressed a preference for hardware support, 
but PfR seemed to actually occupy the driving seat, working to make communities 
‘ready’ to internalise PfR’s emphasis on soft interventions geared towards institutions 
and training.
 Over the course of the programme, it also became apparent that government 
buy-in was lower than PfR assumed. Although the government shared PfR’s con-
viction that communities were important, they saw communities as the end-line of 
sectoral development programmes, and NGOs as resource-providers and facilitators 
for those programmes. A federal government official reflected on community-based 
early-warning systems (9 June 2017), which were also implemented as part of the 
PfR programme (with efforts to link early-warning committees with government 
offices):
[NGOs] can feed us [with ideas], but they should use the common platforms. For instance, 
I would love to have one strong early-warning system in the country. International NGOs 
get resources to do their own community-based early-warning systems, etc. Funders love 
that. But I tell them not to do that, to go with us. So we can create one strong system. 
They invite me to workshops, but I do not go. 
 Although kebele and woreda government officials tolerated the community commit-
tees, this did not change the government’s approach to resilience. The committees 
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remained isolated, with no official legal basis, and unable to advocate for government 
services. This hampered the scaling-up and sustainability of the approach. Although 
the committees and the participatory style of PfR were appreciated, tangible out-
comes were lacking; the knowledge and value of the PfR approach did not reach 
the regional government, so no non-NGO funds or efforts supported the new struc-
tures or follow-up on activities. A former PfR staff member who visited the Borena 
PfR site in 2017 shared the unsurprising news that the local committees had stopped 
operating after the programme ended, as did their facilitation and support of the 
communities.
Findings on resilience building: comparative case studies
In this section, we compare the findings on Ethiopia with findings from four other 
case studies. The comparison focuses on the PfR objectives to (i) unlock community 
potential, and (ii) advance the capacity of community institutions to advocate for gov-
ernment or NGO support to fulfil needs that were beyond community resources. 
We also bring into the comparison PfR’s focus on software components, such as the 
formation of local planning committees and awareness-raising activities, to increase 
community ownership of the programme. Although the set-up of the programme 
across countries was similar, there were differences in how it played out in the gov-
ernance constellation of implementing agencies, government, and communities, and 
in the challenges encountered. 
Nicaragua (based on Strauch, 2015)
There were many similarities between PfR Nicaragua and PfR Ethiopia. Nicaragua 
has a very different history, with civil society strongly engaging with and politicis-
ing processes of DRR (Morales Carbonell and van der Haar, 2017). Nonetheless, 
where PfR operated in Nicaragua, the space for civil society to express views and 
engage in political debate was shrinking. This may have been specific to these geo-
graphical areas, as they had long been affected by drought and had an extended aid 
history. The government displayed a paternalistic approach towards communities, 
and state actors and PfR staff were convinced that the population suffered from 
‘dependency syndrome’. Both the government and PfR considered communities’ 
passive attitude the major obstacle to resilience. This strengthened the emphasis on 
software approaches for behavioural change.
 The programme focused on identifying good CCA and DRR practices based 
on indigenous knowledge and strengthening these with scientific knowledge. PfR 
activities had many positive impacts in communities; however, as in Ethiopia, the 
potential for achieving structural, transformative change was uncertain because com-
munity initiatives were rarely scaled up. This could be attributed to fragility and a 
lack of autonomy in local Nicaraguan committees, which were government-imposed 
structures affiliated with the governing party. Possibilities for a bottom-up policy 
Humanitarian governance and resilience building: Ethiopia in comparative perspective S125
and advocacy approach were limited, as political instability and a fragile social fabric 
added to uncertainty and restricted space for policy-implementation.
Guatemala (based on Dávila Bustamente, 2015)
PfR Guatemala was implemented in five risk-prone departments which have had 
high aid density since the end of the civil war in 1996, usually in the form of human-
itarian handout programmes. Perhaps this was why communities were initially highly 
averse to PfR’s software components. Some communities demanded material sup-
port from PfR and refused to participate in a project without such a component. 
Paradoxically, by refusing to adopt the PfR approach that put community institu-
tions in the driving seat in the programme, the Guatemalan communities steered the 
programme more compared with the Ethiopian communities which followed the 
PfR model. The refusal to participate in participatory development can be a strong 
token of self-determination (see Cooke and Kothari, 2001).
 An in-country survey (n = 145) indicated that residents valued the impact of mate-
rial support to households and communities most, followed by improved social ties, 
environmental restoration and knowledge about integrated risk management. Among 
the different project approaches of implementing partners, ‘bio-rights projects’ stood 
out in terms of community appreciation. In these initiatives, community groups 
received micro-credit loans and training tailored to projects they devised themselves. 
The groups repaid their loans by engaging in ecosystem-based risk-reduction meas-
ures. The projects thus combined community empowerment, material transfers, and 
environmental and livelihood improvements.
 Guatemala was the only case where policy and advocacy efforts were fruitful at 
national level. The PfR programme resulted in a strategic inter-institutional agenda 
to align the plans and actions of key government actors. The NGOs’ previous advo-
cacy experience in the country made the success of this programme-component 
possible. Very early in the programme, the partners developed a roadmap for national-
level advocacy.
Indonesia (based on Srikandini, 2015)
In Indonesia, PfR had a different trajectory. It was implemented during major national 
DRR reform: Indonesia doubled its national DRR budget and created district-level 
multi-stakeholder DRR forums. The conditions thus seemed very favourable for PfR 
to influence policy and practice towards a comprehensive DRR approach grounded 
in environmental management, CCA, and development. However, this potential was 
not realised because the PfR partners were never able—nor did they even aim—to 
align their approaches. The Indonesian PfR partners lacked the Guatemalan partners’ 
experience in planning and performing advocacy, and preferred to continue their 
community programmes as usual. The lack of alignment among PfR partners was 
partly related to the country’s size and its multitude of islands, and was not dealt with 
through monthly meetings or exchange visits, as was the case in Ethiopia.
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 The programme was also not integrated at implementation level, but projects 
in the 37 Indonesian PfR implementation villages usually addressed one or more 
components of PfR, depending on the expertise of the implementing partner. 
Implementers seemed to treat PfR primarily as a funding opportunity to implement 
their own programmes. However, during the PfR implementation, a common 
emphasis on local-level advocacy and training emerged, where community members 
approached the local government (facilitated by PfR) to present their DRR-related 
needs. However, these local advocacy skills did not result in increased responsiveness 
by the local government, and the increased national-level DRR budget did not 
trickle down to the local level. As in Ethiopia, local government officials who, influ-
enced by PfR, became sympathetic to local DRR needs felt incapable of meeting these 
needs because they had no budget for DRR.
Kenya (based on Faling, 2015)
PfR Kenya was implemented in 13 (semi-)arid areas along the Ewaso Nyiro River 
in Isiolo County. As in Ethiopia, PfR initially focused on community-level capacity-
development rather than material assistance. Instead of forming new committees, 
the programme relied on existing community development committees established 
under a previous World Bank programme implemented to streamline and coordinate 
different aid initiatives in the region. Frequent exchange visits took place between 
the communities.
 A Kenyan field staff member described the project as follows: 
PfR is only a project. But the way it is implemented is very sustainable. The seed has been 
planted and the communities are appreciating the approach. Initiatives are increasingly 
coming from community members themselves.
 The programme coincided with extensive national policy reforms aiming for 
decentralisation and improved coordination among the various bodies involved in 
DRR. As in Indonesia, PfR used this as an entry-point to advocate for community-
based integrated risk management. Conditions in Kenya were more favourable for 
a networked type of governance, but this also led to particular challenges: working 
through existing community-organisations reinforced existing power-relations and 
reduced PfR’s leverage in the implementation-process.
 Beyond the community, an umbrella organisation linking several civil-society 
organisations in Kenya was an effective medium for advocacy. The network organ-
ised a 250-kilometre camel march to challenge the national and county governments 
on the negative environmental and social impacts of a mega-dam that was planned 
upstream. The civil-society organisations also managed to engage private companies, 
the local and national media, and some elements of the government in supporting the 
Ewaso Ngiro River communities’ cause. This would have been unthinkable in the 
authoritarian Ethiopian governance context a few hundred kilometres to the north. 
Humanitarian governance, in the Kenyan case, developed into a strong alliance between 
PfR and communities in their effort to mobilise the state.
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Discussion
Humanitarian governance is often treated as a single reality, seen from the point of 
view of international humanitarian actors. This article has viewed governance as 
emerging through interaction among international and national, state, and non-state 
actors. We have analysed governance primarily as the interplay between the state, 
implementing agencies, and communities.
 More specifically, we explored humanitarian governance in the scenario of 
resilience-building programmes. As the cases demonstrate, this type of scenario is 
far removed from the high-conflict aid scenario that usually informs discussions on 
humanitarian governance. Nonetheless, in view of the turn to DRR and the pro-
motion of resilience in addressing natural disasters (see, for example, the Hyogo 
and Sendai Frameworks for Action of 2005 and 2015, respectively (United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), 2005, 2015), this scenario 
represents a widespread and substantial body of practice in the humanitarian domain 
(Kelman, 2017).
 It is important to recognise that the multiple actors involved in governance have 
different understandings of the aims and rules of operation. In this research, we 
developed a tool based on theories of change as an entry-point for our enquiry. ToC 
language enhanced the interactive nature of the research and enabled dialogue with 
PfR stakeholders who were already familiar with the ToC jargon. Although govern-
ance issues varied greatly across the countries, a number of striking patterns appeared.
 Grounded in five in-depth country case studies of a large programme to enhance 
resilience and DRR (Hilhorst et al., 2015), this article revealed one major finding. 
Actors in the PfR agencies, local authorities, and communities often had different 
interpretations of the ToC and different priorities concerning its implementation. 
PfR activities tended to have a strong ‘software’ focus, aiming to unlock communities’ 
potential to become more resilient, but communities—and often local authorities—
preferred to receive more immediate, local and tangible ‘hardware’ support. This 
difference was especially pronounced at the beginning of the programme. One way 
of framing this issue is to see the aid organisations in the PfR alliance as having 
changed their approach to resilience humanitarianism, whereas the local actors pre-
ferred more classic forms of handout humanitarianism (Hilhorst, 2018 ). Clarifying 
and bridging differences in objectives and expectations are thus pivotal parts of the 
humanitarian-governance agenda.
 The findings paint a mixed picture of the power and normative rationale of inter-
vening agencies to shape programming. In the context of intervention, a programme 
like PfR may be experienced as imposing its ideology, even when that ideology places 
communities’ views at the centre. In several countries, community members expressed 
a different preference for addressing their resilience, and implementing and national 
partners felt that the programme was organised in a top-down fashion by the national 
or international headquarters, respectively. However, PfR’s power to shape the pro-
gramme to achieve its objectives seemed limited in many ways. PfR seemed a coher-
ent programme on paper, but, in the complexity of the intervention, there was an 
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abundance of different attitudes to the approach. The Dutch agencies, their in-country 
national counterparts, the authorities, and communities each brought their own 
ideas and interests to the programme implementation. Unsurprisingly, PfR struggled 
to realise its mandate amid the messiness of multi-actor humanitarian governance, 
where the programme was subject to local realities, interests, and collaborations.
 The findings highlight the importance of analysing the different ways governing 
actors view the programme. Particularly striking are the findings about governments. 
Programmes like PfR tend to allot a critical role to the government as a key actor 
which could turn DRR into a sustainable, structured, and scaled-up endeavour, if 
government actors can be convinced to ‘see the light’. Across the countries studied, 
we found many factors cautioning against an optimistic take on this. Despite appar-
ent buy-in on a ToC giving central importance to communities, in practice the 
Ethiopian government had a very different understanding compared with that of the 
PfR partners. These differences ultimately prevented the scaling-up of an integrated 
approach to DRR. For various reasons, including high turnover in local government 
in the Philippines, a local Indonesian government that had hardly any budget and 
was therefore ‘sitting on a dry desk’ (Therkildsen and Tidemand, 2007, p. 8), and 
a lack of coordinated planning in Nicaragua, it was rare that individual government 
actors ‘seeing the light’ would result in changing actual governance practice.
 PfR’s experience provides several ideas on how programmes aiming to realise 
resilience can deal with these situations. One chosen strategy was to seek convergence 
with other policy agendas or national thematic priorities, such as ongoing policy 
reforms. Another strategy was to carefully explore the room for manoeuvre to posi-
tion the programme within existing governance traditions, navigating the prevailing 
realities to achieve some of PfR’s goals. Finally, the duration of the programme could 
be extended, so that different actors might implement, internalise or adapt the hoped-
for changes over a longer period of time.
 The findings remind us that, in humanitarian programming, a localisation agenda 
requires investing in understanding, negotiating, and supporting national actors to 
responsibly implement humanitarian programming for vulnerable people. When 
we reformulate the final conclusion from the point of view of the governments in 
the research, the findings remind us that intervening agencies should avoid setting 
unrealistic objectives that would require great changes in existing priorities and 
historically grown styles of governance. Reformulating the same conclusion from the 
point of view of the communities studied, we are reminded that outsiders intervening 
on behalf of communities should start listening to those communities if they want 
to achieve sustainable results.
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Endnotes
1 We did not include findings from the Philippines, as the PfR programme there focused mainly on 
urban areas and would unduly skew governance comparisons (see Leung, 2015).
2 The organisations worked in Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Nicaragua, the 
Philippines, and Uganda together with 74 implementing partner organisations. See http://www.
partnersforresilience.nl for more information.
3 See the full policy brief (Hilhorst, de Milliano, and Strauch, 2015) and the alliance feedback report 
at http://www.rug.nl/research/globalisation-studies-groningen/projects/partners-for-resilience.
4 The Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development, Action for Development, Ethiopian 
Catholic Secretariat, Dire Dawa Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction Association, and 
Support for Sustainable Development.
5 Interview, field staff, 29 September 2014.
6 Interview, 1 August 2014.
7 Interview, 12 September 2014.
8 For example, the Climate Resilient Green Economy initiative launched in 2011 linked to the five-
year Growth and Transformation Plans, but also the new Disaster Risk Management policy endorsed 
in 2013 (Federal Democratic Government of Ethiopia, 2013).
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